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whether such practices are justifiable. No sooner is a non-citizen involved in the criminal law 
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citizens incoherent. The article also argues that it is both permissible and necessary for a state 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
 
This article has a dual aim. First, it will attempt to make a contribution, however 
modest, to the growing and very important literature on the criminology of 
mobility. In particular, it will outline some aspects of the criminal law-related 
treatment of third country nationals without leave to remain (hereinafter third 
country nationals1 for brevity) in Greece, which is along with Italy the main 
country of first arrival in Europe.2 It will then highlight some consequences of and 
patterns emerging from the ways in which third country nationals become subjects 
of the criminal law. It will not do so from the criminological perspective of 
focusing on actual practices but rather by offering a theoretical discussion of the 
way in which criminal law instruments are constructed and structured so as to 
organise the normative marginalisation of third country nationals from the 
political communities of Greece – although, almost certainly, the same argument 
can be made in other contexts too. This normative marginalisation by the criminal 
law contributes to and, to an extent, facilitates the physical exclusion of third 
country nationals by legitimising it. It also undermines their integration in 
networks of social relations with those with a right to be in the country.  
The second aim is to develop a critique of practices of treating aliens through 
the criminal law by drawing arguments from the logic of the criminal law itself as 
an integral part of the legal system as a whole. The crux of the claim is that no 
sooner does a host country implicate a third country national in its criminal law 
than certain duties on its part are generated to treat the third country national in a 
certain way, duties which crimmigration practices violate. I will also make some 
brief remarks on why it might be permissible for a host state to implicate third 
country nationals in the criminal law as well as on whether there are any 
compelling reasons for a host state to treat third country nationals as proper 
subjects of the criminal law and the legal system at large. 
 
 
                                                      
1 I use the term ‘third country national’ rather than ‘aliens’ in order to draw the distinction between EU 
and non-EU nationals. Nevertheless, the term is still wider than the category of people, to which the 
chapter refers. Some, for example those who seek asylum or those deserving of international protection, 
form sub-categories of third country nationals and are excluded from the ambit of the provisions 
discussed here. However, even many of those who would fall under these exceptions in practice do not 
for a number of reasons: they might not have the relevant information to request recognition of their 
status, they might not want their status to be recognised and so on. A reasonable question to ask is how 
many people might be covered by the criminal laws, to which I refer in this article. The number of 
irregular migrants is notoriously difficult to estimate. The only thing that one can say with any certainty is 
that there are some 20,000 people without leave to remain, who have already lived in Greece for seven 
years and have applied for leave (and have therefore been granted immunity from being returned to their 
points of origin). A rough, unofficial estimate of the total number is at least 150,000.  
2 The International Organization for Migration provides up to date information on migration flows into 
Europe: http://migration.iom.int/europe/. 
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2    ‘CRIMMIGRATION’ IN GREECE: IMPLICATING THIRD 
COUNTRY NATIONALS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Let me start with a brief outline, without going into much technical detail, of some 
ways in which third country nationals in Greece are implicated in the criminal law 
and the ramifications of this implication for their status. The list that follows is by 
no means exclusive. It does, however, include some central criminal law 
institutions governing crucial junctures of third country nationals’ existence in 
Greek territory. 
Third country nationals tend to be treated as subjects of the criminal law as 
soon as they reach the country’s border. The Greek Immigration and Social 
Integration Code (Law 4251/2014, hereafter ISIC), which consolidated and 
amended previous legislation and introduced a number of new provisions, 
provides – in-line with the Schengen Agreement and its Implementation 
Convention – that a third country national can be refused entry into the country.3 
Among other reasons, such as not possessing the appropriate documents, entry 
can be refused if the third country national is registered in the Schengen 
Information System as an unwanted alien or if she poses a threat to public order, 
national security, public health, or the international relations of an EU Member 
State. There is a presumption that such a threat is posed if the third country 
national is registered in the list of unwanted aliens (more on which below). Those 
included in the list must leave the country immediately. Otherwise, they are 
redirected either to the country of provenance or to a third country. The welcome 
amendment that the ISIC introduced in relation to previous legislation is that the 
executive is under an obligation fully and expressly to ground entry refusal 
decisions. 
The same requirements follow third country nationals after they have already 
entered Greek territory. The ISIC maintains two central procedures from the 
relevant provisions of Law 3386/2005 for expelling third country nationals on the 
basis of their implication in the criminal law (alongside other grounds).4  
According to Art. 82, a list of unwanted aliens is kept with the criteria of 
inclusion in the list being determined by the executive. These are currently: a 
previous administrative or judicial extradition order; the third country national’s 
presence in the country posing a threat to national security or public order with 
the presumption that such a threat is posed when there are serious grounds for 
believing that he has committed serious criminal offences or there is clear 
                                                      
3 This does not apply to those seeking asylum or deserve international protection. In those cases, the 
procedure is governed by the Geneva Convention and Law 4375/2016, which implements Directive 
2013/33/EU. Nevertheless, it is possible, and there have been such cases, that people who want to enter 
the country and join close relatives who have already been granted, often indefinite, leave to remain are 
refused entry on grounds of national security and public order on the basis of this article of the ISIC. 
Authorities tend to apply this extensively even in cases in which it is quite obvious that no threat to 
national security is posed (for example, elderly relatives have been known to have been refused entry 
because they ostensibly pose a threat to national security). 
4 Third country nationals, with the exception of those belonging in ‘vulnerable’ groups, can also be 
expelled under Law 3907/2011, which implements the so-called Return Directive 2008/115/EC. 
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evidence of an intention to commit such offences in Greek territory (this 
presumption is in application of Art. 96(b) of the 1990 Convention implementing 
the Schengen Agreement). Inclusion in the list creates the duty on the part of the 
third country national to leave the country within a deadline set by the executive. 
If she fails to do so, she may be subject to administrative expulsion. 
Administrative expulsion can also be grounded directly in the third country 
national’s criminal profile. According to Art. 76 of Law 3386/2005, those with 
custodial sentences of at least one year or with convictions for a range of serious 
offences independently of sentence, those who breach any of the provisions of 
Law 3386/2005 which have remained in force after the introduction of the ISIC, 
those whose presence in the country poses a risk to public order or national 
security, and those posing a risk to public health may be expelled by police order. 
The third country national can be held in remand, if deemed a flight risk or a 
threat to public order. She may raise objections to the decision before an 
administrative judge but this is not a formal criminal appellate procedure. There is 
also provision for an appeal before the executive, with a five-day deadline, which 
suspends the execution of the expulsion, but not the custodial, order. 
Art. 83 of Law 3386/2005 makes it an offence for third country nationals to 
enter or exit the country or to attempt to do either without the appropriate 
documents (this is an independent attempt offence, not the inchoate offence of 
Art. 42 of the Greek Criminal Code). Note that being in the country without the 
appropriate legal documentation is not in itself an offence. It is also generally 
accepted (despite a small body of jurisprudence to the contrary) that the offence 
of entering is instantaneous and its actus reus is completed as soon as the third 
country national has entered or attempted to enter the territory.5 This means that 
the period of statutory barring begins at the time of completion of the offence, i.e. 
at the time of entering the country. Later arrests and prosecutions are therefore 
not in flagrante. In reality though, labelling the crime as instantaneous is 
meaningless because the administrative expulsion process trumps, both in law and 
in practice, criminal prosecution. A third country national, who has illegally 
entered or attempted to enter the country, can very simply be expelled by police 
order (recall that Art. 76 applies to those who have breached any of the provisions 
of the statute as well as other criminal offences). It follows that statutory temporal 
barring or the in flagrante rule do not apply and the dominant position is that there 
are no limits to when administrative expulsion can take place. A further very 
important upshot of the construction of the Art. 83 offence is that another party 
cannot be complicit to a third country national’s presence in the country.  
Indeed, the administrative expulsion process of Art. 76 potentially trumps, 
and in practice does indeed trump, every other way of governing the presence of 
                                                      
5 This is largely grounded on a Prosecutor’s interpretative opinion (although these are not formally 
binding, they are persuasive sources of legal interpretation for courts) delivered in 1996 in the context of 
an earlier version of the same law (3216/1996 Opinion of the Public Prosecutor of Thessaloniki).  
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third country nationals in the country. But even if one’s case takes the criminal 
procedure route, criminal prosecution for the offences of Art. 83 can be waived 
and substituted by judicial expulsion on the order of a Public Prosecutor (who, in 
Greece, are members of the judiciary). The Prosecutor communicates her decision 
to the relevant police or coastguard authority in whatever suitable and expedient 
means, therefore by-passing the need for any formal notification, so that the third 
country national be immediately redirected or, should this not be immediately 
possible, that the expulsion process be commenced. Interestingly, much hangs on 
the interpretation of the immediacy requirement for the removal of the third 
country national if so ordered by a prosecutor who has decided to waive full-
blown criminal prosecution. The removal can take place outside the in flagrante 
period (currently a maximum of 24 hours) to allow for contingencies such as 
transportation difficulties and so forth, so long as the state officials involved are 
not responsible, intentionally or negligently, for the delay. 
Articles 29 and 30 of the ISIC present us with a different but exceptionally 
interesting case, because they do not criminalise third country nationals but rather 
Greek citizens or anyone else legally in the country. The offences introduced here 
are independent, that is not derivative of the offences committed by third country 
nationals outlined above. 
Art. 29(6) conjunctively introduces a number of offences: i) facilitating the 
residence of a third country national in the country; ii) obstructing the police in a) 
tracking down, b) arresting, c) or expelling a third party national. Committing the 
offence for a profit is an aggravating circumstance. According to Art. 29(5) it is an 
offence to facilitate the a) entry into or b) exit from the country of a third country 
national who has not gone through the appropriate process (set in Art. 5 of the 
ISIC). Acting for a profit, professionally, habitually, or in collaboration with 
another or others are aggravating circumstances but do not have a bearing on the 
scope of application of the provision.  
Art. 30 makes it an offence to transport third country nationals, who do not 
have the right to remain in Greece, either into, in, or out of the country and into 
another EU member state. The sentences range from 10 years in prison and a 
€10,000-€30,000 per person transported to life imprisonment and a fine of at least 
€700,000 per person transported depending on the presence of aggravating 
circumstances. The harsher sentences apply to traffickers but, as is the case in Art. 
29, whether the defendant is a trafficker or a smuggler or neither does not have a 
bearing on the scope of application of the offence. The offences are independent 
from the defendant’s ulterior intent.6  
                                                      
6 Art. 29 and 30 are linked to the so-called Facilitation Directive (2002/90/EC). For a detailed legal and 
moral analysis of the directive and related issues see R. Landry, ‘The Humanitarian Smuggling of 
Refugees: Criminal Offence or Moral Obligation?’, Working Paper Series No.119, Refugee Studies 
Centre, University of Oxford, October 2016 (https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/the-
2018humanitarian-smuggling2019-of-refugees-criminal-offence-or-moral-obligation). See also M. 
Provera, ‘The Criminalisation of Irregular Migration in the European Union’, CEPS Paper in Liberty and 
Security in Europe 80:1-48 (https://www.ceps.eu/publications/criminalisation-irregular-migration-
european-union). 
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A 2015 amendment to the ISIC consolidated and slightly expanded the 
defences to the Art. 30 offences in a rather interesting way. The offences are not 
committed when the acts are performed while rescuing people at sea, when the 
person transported is one deserving of international protection, and, importantly, 
in order to facilitate the third country national’s subjection to the legal process of 
assessing her status in order for them to be granted leave to remain and only if the 
police or the coastguard have been notified in advance. According to recent, 
though limited, first instance court jurisprudence the general necessity defence of 
Art. 25 of the Greek Criminal Code is not available to defendants under Art. 30. 
 
 
 
3     SOME EMERGING PATTERNS OF EXCLUSION 
 
We should now have sufficient information to single out some patterns of 
exclusion of third country nationals from the political community through the 
ways, in which they are treated as subjects of the Greek criminal law. I am hoping 
that what follows might also contribute to the framework of studying 
crimmigration practices across Europe. 
 
3.1   SELECTIVE INCLUSION IN AND EXCLUSION FROM THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
At various turns third country nationals are treated by the law as criminally liable, 
in domestic criminal law or in other jurisdictions. Imputing criminal responsibility 
to them subsequently grounds their coercive treatment by the host state. This, 
however, is not accompanied by the increased protection that the criminal law 
typically affords defendants. Refusal of entry and expulsion decisions generally 
have to be properly grounded but they are either acts of the executive or acts of 
the judiciary which by-pass the penal procedure and defer competence to the 
executive to carry out the expulsion. This is so in all three broad categories of 
third country nationals without a right to remain in the country. The differences 
between these three categories relate to the degree of asymmetry between the third 
country nationals’ penally relevant conduct and the consequences incurred. 
(1) The criminal profile of those who already carry criminal convictions from 
outside Greece may ground refusal of entry or expulsion as a threat to public 
order or national security. The involvement in the criminal law abroad therefore 
serves to ground consequences brought about in Greece. This correlation of a 
criminal law infraction and certain consequences is generally governed by rules, 
which also typically provide a higher level of protection to the defendant. These 
rules, however, are not activated in this case, despite the obvious correlation 
between criminal responsibility and consequences. The issue here is not one of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction nor is it necessarily morally unthinkable for a state to 
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hold one criminally responsible domestically for crimes committed elsewhere 
should these crimes have some impact within the state’s territory (though this is 
not an argument that I can develop here). The problem is that a certain course of 
conduct serves as a justification for onerous consequences without this relation of 
imputation being governed by robust procedural and substantive rules.7 
(2) This asymmetry is even further pronounced in the second case, namely of 
those who simply raise the suspicion of intending to commit criminal offences in 
Greece, on the basis of any past conduct, whether they have committed criminal 
offences elsewhere or not. Recall that entry refusal or expulsion decisions are 
based on criminally relevant behaviour. Once again, the problem here is not that 
this is necessarily ex ante criminalisation. It might not be altogether unjustifiable for 
a state to punish for manifest intentions if these have an external impact on the 
normative relations within the political community (this is again not an argument 
that can be developed here further). The problem is located in the asymmetry 
between the criminal law grounds for holding the third country national 
responsible and the subsequent treatment of the person as an administrative 
subject. 
(3) Finally, the pattern of not affording third country nationals the protection 
that the criminal law, both substantive and procedural, generally makes available to 
defendants persists in the case of those who commit offences, either immigration-
related or not, while already in Greece. This reaches its pinnacle in two moments. 
First, in the waiving of prosecution in favour of a prosecutorial expulsion order. 
What is defined in the law as a criminal offence is quickly turned into the 
administrative matter of processing the defendant. Secondly, in Art. 76(1)(c), 
which, reiterating the ubiquitous public order and security clause, gives the 
executive the freedom to override the requisite criminal procedure that 
accompanies the commission of a criminal offence and proceed to administrative 
expulsion on the vague terms of security, a freedom of which the executive makes 
ample use in practice. The subject of the criminal law is quickly transformed into 
an object of administrative law to be processed by the relevant authorities. 
That the administrivisation of third country nationals leaves them at the 
mercy of often irrational and ungrounded decisions of the executive should be 
quite obvious. But it also exposes them to a subtler nexus of relative arbitrariness. 
Recall that, according to Art. 76 of Law 3386/2005, a third country national may 
be expelled if she has been handed a custodial sentence of a year or more. The key 
is what a one-year custodial sentence means. The Greek Criminal Code gives 
                                                      
7 This broadly mirrors a pattern identified by Catherine Dauvergne in relation to the intertwining between 
refugee law and international criminal law. Non-implication in international law offences is generally an 
admission requirement of asylum applicants in domestic jurisdictions. This comes with some added 
twists. First, the definition of political crimes, which would enjoy differential treatment in international 
criminal law, is tweaked in the context of refugee law so as to exclude from the outset any reasonable 
claims to political crime defences. Secondly, there is an asymmetry between the lengthy and resource-
intensive procedure of international criminal law and the assessment of asylum applications. Thirdly, and 
relatedly, the fair trial provisions that apply to international criminal law do not apply to asylum 
procedures. See C. Dauvergne, ‘The Troublesome Intersections of Refugee Law and Criminal Law’ in The 
Borders of Punishment (K. Franko Aas and M. Bosworth eds.) (Oxford University Press 2013) pp.76-90. 
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courts a great amount of discretion in sentencing. It is not uncommon for the 
prescribed penalty for misdemeanours to be imprisonment of a few months (the 
minimum is one month) and up to five years. Therefore, whether a third country 
national has been handed a prison sentence of one year might not have to do so 
much with the gravity of the offence she committed but rather with the particular 
court’s disposition and sentencing practice.8 
The administrivisation of the penal subject at times also leads to rather 
paradoxical results. The one-year custodial sentence expulsion cases again provide 
a useful example. Motivated mainly by prison decongestion concerns, the Criminal 
Code now makes the conversion of custodial sentences of up to five years to a 
fine almost a routine practice. This has rather interesting implications. Someone 
with a nominal one-year custodial sentence or longer might not serve any of it, 
because it is assumed that the offence is not considered serious enough to 
necessitate the sentence actually being served or because the offender is not 
considered likely to reoffend (if the offender does pose such a risk, then the 
conversion is not made available to her), but might still be expelled from the 
country on the assumption that she poses a threat to national security or public 
order simply because she is a third country national. 
 
3.2  THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL STATUS AS THE ACTUS REUS OF CRIMINAL 
OFFENCES 
 
Greek law makes the citizenship status of third country nationals part of the actus 
reus elements of the offences of illegal entry or attempted entry in or exit or 
attempted exit from the country. If one with leave to remain performed exactly 
the same acts, they would of course not be committing a criminal offence.9 
One might wonder why it might be remarkable that these offences include 
the status of the defendant in the actus reus. Alessandro Spena considers them to be 
manifestations of what he terms ‘spurious’ Täterstrafrecht; whereas the offence 
                                                      
8 The range of penalties is currently under review by a criminal code reform committee but whether the 
current committee will succeed where its numerous predecessors have failed and whether a new code will 
be in fact be enacted remains to be seen. 
9 Citizenship status and actus reus are intermingled in other ways too across Europe. Let me draw a parallel 
to two characteristic examples. In some cases that an offence is being committed within the context of 
the process of immigration control, either by third country nationals or not, either renders the offence a 
delictum sui generis and/or aggravates it. For example, s.3 of the UK Borders Act makes assaulting 
immigration officers a specific offence incurring a heftier penalty than the basic s.39 assault of the 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861. To form a complete picture, one should also consider practices, 
in which a defendant’s status as a third country national might not be written into the law but guides the 
enforcement of the relevant rules. A very representative example comes from Sweden. As Vanessa Barker 
shows, there is a pattern of third country nationals who beg or engage in other ‘vagrant’ activities to be 
involved in the criminal justice system rather than be afforded the provisions of the welfare state. Very 
interestingly, this practice is premised on a rhetoric of dignity and protection of the defendant as well as, 
indirectly, the community as a whole from the indignity of begging. This is why Barker intriguingly dubs 
it ‘benevolent violence’. V. Barker, Nordic vagabonds: The Roma and the logic of benevolent violence in 
the Swedish welfare state, European Journal of Criminology (2017) 14/1 pp.120-139. 
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ostensibly targets the defendant’s actions, in reality it targets the defendants 
themselves, who are considered dangerous or essentially criminal precisely because 
of their status or one of its aspects.10 Spena’s claim is that criminalising the actor 
rather than the action is at odds with the point of the criminal law. Although this 
critical claim is correct, it is not entirely clear that the case of offences determined 
by one’s citizenship status really are instances of Täterstrafrecht, spurious or 
otherwise. This would be the case if the inculpating element were an innate 
characteristic of the defendant. It is, however, obviously not uncommon for the 
criminal law to make a contingent, institutional feature of the defendant’s identity 
an element of an offence. The question then would be whether it is permissible to 
criminalise a certain act that could not have been committed had the defendant 
not borne that specific characteristic. This is a substantive and context-sensitive 
question, the answer to which does not depend on the form of the offence. 
There are, however, two other, interrelated noteworthy things about offences 
of this sort. First, one’s status as a third country national without leave to remain is 
negative; it indicates a characteristic that one does not have. For it to become a 
positive legal status, a legal instrument must regulate it. Criminal laws which make 
illegal entry without the appropriate documents are such instruments. In other 
words, one’s status as a third country national is determined, at least partly, by the 
prohibition of entering the country. Therefore, the offence both creates its subject 
and authorises the subject’s coercive treatment when the criminal law is meant 
coercively to regulate activities, which are possible independently from their 
regulation by the criminal law. This is different to the question of the 
permissibility of criminalising mala prohibita. That concerns a certain conduct’s 
wrongfulness, whereas in the case at hand, it is a matter regarding the very 
conditions of possibility of the action. Nor should it be confused with omissions 
liability, for the obvious reason that it is not within the third country national’s 
control to obtain leave to remain. Her citizenship status is determined by the 
criminal law as soon as she attempts to enter the country. 
The second related point is a normative extension of the first one and I will 
discuss it later under section 5.1. 
 
3.3  THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS ALWAYS STRANDED AT THE BORDER 
 
Earlier on I tentatively introduced a distinction between third country nationals at 
the border and after having crossed it. It is now clear, however, that this 
distinction may hold in physical terms but, when it comes to their normative 
standing for the purposes of the criminal law, third country nationals always 
remain at the border. 
Recall some of the penally relevant regulation of third country nationals: their 
entry and continued presence in the country depends on their criminal profile; 
                                                      
10 A. Spena, Iniuria Migrandi: Criminalization of Immigrants and the Basic Principles of the Criminal 
Law, Criminal Law and Philosophy (2014) 8, pp.635–657. 
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entering into or exiting the country illegally is an offence; crucially, their presence 
in the country is not independently criminalised; they are not treated as 
accomplices in the accommodation and transportation offences of Articles 29 and 
30. 
There might have been two possibilities of recognising the normative 
presence of third country nationals in the country. The first would be through the 
instantaneous character of the offence of illegal entry. It could have been the case 
that the third country national commits an instantaneous crime entering the 
country but then gradually enters the political community as a subject of the law. 
The rest of the structure of related provisions, however, undermine this 
opportunity. Transforming the offence into an administrative matter through the 
expulsion process of Art. 76, waiving prosecution, prolonging the timeframe of 
judicial expulsion beyond the in flagrante period, contribute to keeping the third 
country national in the limbo of rightlessness at the border. 
The second way would be if they committed a different criminal offence 
while in Greece, in which case they would be afforded the protection of criminal 
procedure and the criminal justice system at large. Even this recognition through 
the exclusion of punishment, however, is not afforded to third country nationals 
in the way that is afforded to citizens. The commission of any criminal offence 
can, and routinely does, result in their administrative expulsion from the country. 
Therefore, violations of the criminal law on their part are only disruptions by 
someone who has no normative position in Greece. Their labelling as criminal 
offenders is only nominal. 
Another way of looking at this is in terms of how the law cuts across the 
dimensions of existence of the third country nationals. Physically they are in the 
country. Their spatial dimension, however, is severed from their temporality, 
which is substituted by and subsumed under the structure of legal provisions 
grounding them at the threshold. The application of legal judgment to real world 
facts always presupposes a suspension of the latter’s temporality. Criminal 
responsibility, for example, can only be apportioned with reference to an isolated 
temporal fragment; expand the timeframe and radical indeterminacy ensues 
because of the proliferation of causal relations between events and because of the 
increasing complexity of the psychological attitudes, which would constitute the 
defendant’s mens rea. For it to be grounded, punishment must also assume the 
image of the defendant at the time of commission of the offence. In the case of all 
other criminal offences, however, this reduction of time to legal judgment, 
although detrimental, as is every instance of reduction, does not eradicate the 
offender’s legal personality. It transforms it in significant respects but it does not 
deprive the offender of all normative membership in the political community. In 
the case of third country nationals, however, the judgment of the criminal law 
governs the entirety of their presence in Greece; their wrong is trying to enter the 
country and the response to this wrong is expulsion. This precludes every other 
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instance of normative participation in the political community and its institutional 
structure. As legal subjects, third country nationals are always at the border. 
 
3.4  THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS EXCLUDED FROM THE CRIMINAL LAW 
ALTOGETHER 
 
So far, I have highlighted the differential treatment of third country nationals as 
special subjects of the criminal law and the instrumental role that the criminal law 
plays in keeping third country nationals always at the border denying them 
membership of the political community. I will now turn to a pattern, which is even 
more worrying: third country nationals are altogether excluded from the ambit of 
the criminal law. 
There is a worrying trend developing in Europe and elsewhere; a trend of 
making third country nationals the objects of the criminal law but not its subjects. 
Mitsilegas gives a detailed survey of practices of employing domestic criminal law 
in order to prevent third country nationals even reaching the borders of European 
states. This is done mainly through legislation, which targets traffickers and 
smugglers rather than third country nationals themselves.11 
But the pattern seems to be reaching the border too. Let us consider the 
offences of Articles 29 and 30 a little more closely. A central element of the actus 
reus is the very status of the person transported. Had the third country nationals 
been Greek or EU citizens or had other leave to be in the country, the acts of 
providing or transportation would have been innocent; indeed, admirable acts of 
hospitality. The third country nationals’ citizenship status makes the very 
interaction with them in a non-harmful manner a criminal offence. The wrong is 
thus displaced from the actions of the defendant themselves to features of the 
object of the offence. 
The primary (but not sole) targets of these offences are traffickers and 
smugglers. What is striking, however, is that on the construction of the offences 
their actions are not wrong because they exploit and endanger other human beings 
but because they facilitate the entry with people who do not have right of access 
to a territory. Third country nationals are therefore not constructed even as proper 
victims of the offence in the criminal law sense. Sure enough, there are other 
provisions for victims of trafficking. Art. 19A of the ISIC provides that victims of 
trafficking or a number of other offences may, for ‘humanitarian reasons’ be 
granted leave to remain, which is, however, temporary (one year in the first 
instance) and heavily conditioned. Article 49 grants trafficking and smuggling 
victims a three-month period of ‘deliberation’ for them to overcome the trauma of 
their experience, an affordance which can be withdrawn should it transpire that 
the victim has rekindled her relations with the traffickers/smugglers or, yet again, 
‘for reasons of public order and security’. Therefore, even the recognition of third 
                                                      
11 V. Mitsilegas, The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Challenges for Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
(Springer 2015). 
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country nationals as victims keeps them outside the realm of the criminal law. It is 
an administratively organised act of charity. Charity is an unequal relationship par 
excellence not only because of the inequality of resources between the charitable 
person and the subject of her philanthropy but also, and perhaps primarily, 
because the latter does not participate in the determination of the norms justifying 
and defining the charitable act. Recognising victims as the objects of charity again 
prevents third country nationals from being fully-fledged legal subjects of the law 
and therefore excludes them from membership of the political community. 
At the same time, the opportunity that citizens have to associate normatively 
with third country nationals is curtailed. Recall that the presence in the country 
without leave is not in itself a criminal offence. This means that one cannot be 
complicit to an offence committed by a third country national committed by being 
in the country. Combine this with the fact that Art. 29 and 30 offences are 
dissociated from the illegal entry offences and the clear line that separates citizens 
from non-citizens is revealed. 
This normative separation has another important ramification. The radical 
exclusion from the criminal law goes even deeper, because it ruptures social and 
political relations. As the offences of Articles 29 and 30 are not sensitive to the 
motivation of the defendant, they apply not only to traffickers and smugglers but 
also to anyone performing the acts in question. This, of course, includes 
volunteers, of whom there have been thousands, who provide assistance to third 
country nationals motivated by a sense of solidarity. This is not only a theoretical 
possibility; volunteers have in fact been prosecuted in mid-January 2016 five 
volunteers, members of NGOs were arrested and subsequently prosecuted for 
towing ashore refugees struggling in plastic dinghies off the coast of the Greek 
island of Lesvos. Similarly, in the summer of 2015 more volunteers were 
prosecuted for transporting refugees inland (these did not lead to convictions).12 
So, the parties in these relations find themselves in an impossible tension 
between different ways of relating to each other. Simply being in a certain place at 
a certain time reduces third country nationals to a miasma, and it is a 
crimen/κρίμα, a sin for citizens to interact with them. The latter are treated by the 
criminal law in a way that undercuts their social relations with third country 
nationals. This penetration of the criminal law into social relations usually meets 
its limits at the point of harm or, at any rate, some manifest wrongfulness. Here, 
however, the overlap is complete. Citizens are faced with incompatible sets of 
reasons for acting towards third country nationals and their motivational 
disposition is similarly torn in two. 
This culminates in the defence available to those prosecuted under Art. 30. 
Recall that one does not commit the offence, if one aims at facilitating the 
                                                      
12 Note that arrests and prosecutions continued even after the introduction of the defences in 2015. The 
Greek Ombudsman has intervened on the matter: http://www.synigoros.gr/resources/150727-stp.pdf 
(in Greek). 
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subjection of the third country national to the appropriate process of registration, 
asylum application and so forth. Volunteers are thus justified to interact with third 
country national only if they act as proxies of the state and participate in the 
rendering of the objects of the offence into administrative subjects-objects. The 
defence does not restore the possibility of social relations developing between 
those with leave to remain and those without; on the contrary, it deepens the rift 
because it makes citizens complicit to the administrativisation of the existence of 
third country nationals and their exclusion from the political community.  
 
 
 
4     WHAT IS WRONG WITH ‘CRIMMIGRATION’ PRACTICES? 
 
The analysis so far has been largely diagnostic, singling out some ways in which 
third country nationals are treated in Greece largely as a result of implementing 
EU law requirements. I have also suggested that these patterns are different and 
mutually complementary ways of marginalising third country nationals and 
excluding them from the political community of the host state. 
However, I have so far not touched upon the question of justification. Why 
do we have reason to believe that it is impossible to ground the differential 
treatment and marginalisation of third country nationals?  
 
4.1  EXTERNAL CRITIQUE 
 
One could engage in external institutional critique in that one could find 
inconsistencies with obligations that states have towards non-citizens on the basis 
of international law and human rights. Such objections are of course important 
and could make a great deal of difference but I leave them to one side. 
International promise-based commitments are extremely fragile and easy to renege 
on both formally and in practice. The way, in which refugees have been treated in 
Europe since 2015, and especially the return agreement with Turkey, is the most 
recent indication of this. I therefore consider it a more challenging and pressing 
problem to find constraints to how a state can treat third country nationals drawn 
from within the constitutive conditions of the political community, which the state 
represents. More specifically, I want to explore whether any constraints to the 
penal treatment of third country nationals can be drawn from the logic of the 
criminal law itself. 
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4.2   THE ARGUMENT FROM WRONGFUL CRIMINALISATION 
 
Some take issue with immigration-related offences themselves. For example, Ana 
Aliverti believes that the very terms of criminalisation are problematic.13 The 
majority of such offences are offences of possession (primarily of counterfeit 
documents); omission (e.g. not being in possession of appropriate documents, 
failing to cooperate with immigration authorities etc.); status (being in the territory 
of the host state); strict liability; low harm levels (abstract endangerment is often 
resorted too as justification for such crimes). These are reflected in Greek 
legislation as well; both in the offences that I have outlined as well as others, 
which I left undiscussed. The objection is along the lines of the general argument 
against such offences: the threshold of criminalisation is too low.14 
I will not discuss the substance of the argument from wrongful 
criminalisation, because I think there is a prior issue with the argument’s very 
character that does not allow it to get of the ground as a general critique of 
crimmigration practices. The claim that criminal offences lower the threshold of 
criminalisation by relaxing either the act and/or fault requirements already 
presupposes a general conception of wrongfulness. Such a conception, however, 
will inevitably be controversial and therefore extremely vulnerable to external 
critique. To illustrate, Aliverti seems to assume that causing harm to others is 
generally a minimum condition of criminalisation. Clearly, further, external 
argument is required for compelling one to accept this. It follows that one also 
does not have compelling reason to accept the accompanying critique of 
crimmigration. For example, suppose that we think of penally relevant wrongs not 
in terms of harm but rather as the unauthorised interference or domination. This 
already significantly widens the scope of criminalisation in a way that might permit 
a larger number of inchoate crimes or even offences with minimal act and fault 
requirements on the condition that they are wrongful because they interfere with 
the liberty of others in one way or another.  
Alternatively, the scope of the wrongful criminalisation claim might be 
narrower and only apply to specific jurisdictions. This might be a more promising 
reading, because the argument can be possibly measured up against a specific 
institutional structure in light of the systemic requirement of normative coherence. 
But the mess of institutional reality, which allows for a wide range of possible 
reconstructions makes even this so controversial as to leave the debate 
inconclusive. Moreover, such a jurisdiction by jurisdiction reconstructive approach 
would not allow us to articulate a general critical argument with a wider scope of 
applicability. 
 
                                                      
13 A. Aliverti, ‘The Wrongs of Unlawful Immigration’, Criminal Law and Philosophy online first publication 
doi:10.1007/s11572-015-9377-y (2015). 
14 Lucia Zedner raises similar points: L. Zedner, ‘Is the Criminal Law Only for Citizens? A Problem at the 
Borders of Punishment’, in Franko Aas and Bosworth (n 5), pp.40-57. 
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4.3  DOES CRIMMIGRATION REVEAL A PATHOLOGY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES? 
 
Some think that the differential treatment of third country nationals reveals a 
much deeper, and irremediable, problem. It is the state’s prerogative, the argument 
would go, to reserve certain protections for its citizens or, at any rate, for those to 
whom the state has granted membership rights, and treat others as outsiders. This 
is because citizenship is a necessary threshold requirement for one’s participation 
in the political community as a bearer of rights. This not only makes non-citizens 
vulnerable to being treated differentially by the state but it also helps to reaffirm 
the closure of the political community and to strengthen the bonds that constitute 
it. Vanessa Barker thinks that this exclusionary tendency of modern liberal 
democracy finds its pinnacle in the case of deportations:  
 
The deportation of criminal aliens dramatically captures the paradox of 
democracy. The reason a criminal alien is deported is because of his or her 
alienage, because of his or her status as a non-citizen. Citizens who commit 
the same crime and serve the same time in the criminal justice system are not 
then subject to deportation; this sanction is reserved for non-nationals. 
Deportation, or expulsion, is one of the most extreme forms of state power –
the state effectively cuts off all ties, connection, and any obligation to the 
person: deportation is a kind of civic death.15 
 
This is ostensibly what the appeals to the rhetoric of security and order, which, as 
I have highlighted, abound in European and Greek law, reflect. Third country 
nationals who are implicated in the commission of criminal offences purportedly 
pose a threat to the cohesion of the political community of the host state because 
they disrupt its peaceful functioning. It is not entirely clear why this argument 
would hold citizens who violate the criminal law to not pose the same threat. 
Presumably the answer would go along the following lines. Citizens have accepted 
the values of the political community that the criminal law entrenches and 
enforces. Violation of the criminal law by citizens is therefore considered 
exceptional; enforcement and punishment restores the previous order of 
generalised acceptance. Non-citizens, on the other hand, have not displayed the 
same commitment to the values animating the political community and their 
criminal transgressions manifest a default, hostile disposition towards these values. 
In this picture, Feindstrafrecht16 appears not only as a justified employment of the 
criminal law but as an inevitability. Its scope also becomes much wider; it is not 
only those who express radical animosity against a state that are the enemies but 
potentially every non-citizen. 
                                                      
15 V. Barker, ‘Democracy and Deportation: Why Membership Matters Most’, in Franko Aas and 
Bosworth (n 7) pp. 237-254. 
16 G Jakobs, ‘Selbstverständnis der Strafrechtswissenschaft vor den Herausforderungen der Gegenwart 
(Kommentar)’ in A Eser, W Hassemer, and B Burkhardt (eds), Die deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft vor der 
Jahrtausendwende (C.H.Beck 2000). 
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Lucia Zedner believes that the inescapable exclusionary force exerted by 
citizenship-based democracy also reveals a serious limitation of theories, which 
take a public law/political approach to the grounding of the criminal law.17 If the 
criterion of publicity, which determines the conditions of criminalisation, criminal 
responsibility, as well as the limits of punishment, is so closely associated with 
membership qua citizenship, it necessarily follows that it is permissible for the state 
to use the harsh treatment that the criminal law authorises to exclude non-citizens 
from the political community. 
This type of argument goes to the heart of the matter to the extent that it 
places the problem in the very conditions of operation of modern states. 
However, I believe that the critique is for the most part misplaced. It is the case 
that the criminal law governing third country nationals employs the rhetoric of 
exclusion but it does so at the price of incoherence. This is what I will argue in the 
following section. 
 
 
 
5 THE INCOHERENCE OF CRIMMIGRATION PRACTICES 
 
Spena sees the exclusiveness of the criminal law, with emphasis on offences of 
illegal immigration, as animated by the metaphor of the home:  
 
The wrongness of {irregular migration} might be conceived accordingly, as 
a kind of trespass into the territory of states—and thus, metaphorically, into 
each citizen’s home; something like an attack on the citizens’ right to 
exclude unwanted strangers from their homes, as though irregular 
immigrants (and, more generally, ‘‘irregular enterers’’) violated the citizens’ 
‘‘common home’’.18 
 
He then goes on to argue that the metaphor collapses as soon as it is raised, 
because it rests on the false assumption that national territory can be represented 
in terms of a private sphere, which enjoys protection against trespass. Spena’s 
objection to this assumption is that the territory of the state is valuable because it 
serves public interests and enables public relationships. The character of the 
territory of the state is therefore not to be conflated with the inviolable private 
sphere of individuals, which the home represents. Nor, Spena continues, can the 
territory of the state be plausibly thought of as the state’s property.  
Although the general orientation of Spena’s critique is correct, I think that it 
overemphasises the home metaphor. The justified exclusion claim is not based on 
                                                      
17 Zedner (n 14). 
18 A. Spena, ‘A Just Criminalization of Irregular Immigration: Is It Possible?’, Criminal Law and Philosophy, 
online pre-publication DOI 10.1007/s11572-015-9375-0 (2015). 
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the assumption that illegal immigration is a crime of trespass but rather that the 
migrant forces her way in an unauthorised manner into a political community, of 
which she is not a member, while at the same time engaging in normative 
interactions within the domain of the state. And it is this unwarranted interaction 
that ostensibly justifies exclusion.  
I would suggest that a critique of crimmigration practices must distinguish 
between three stages of implicating third country nationals in the criminal law, 
which are often conflated. I will examine these in turn putting more emphasis on 
the first stage, which is where the most pressing problem in fact emerges. It 
should also be noted that the arguments in this section apply to all citizens. 
Nevertheless, I will continue to focus on those without leave to remain, as their 
case poses the most difficult questions. 
 
5.1  DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AFTER CRIMINALISATION 
 
As we saw above, the justified exclusion claim, which many attribute to modern 
liberal democracies as well as to political theories of the criminal law, assumes that 
citizenship is a necessary threshold requirement of being treated in a certain way 
by the law generally and the criminal law in particular. This entails a view of 
citizenship as a state of being. In doing so, it takes as true the familiar 
counterfactual that informs much of the social contract tradition of the transition 
from the state of nature to a rightful condition of political belonging to be the way 
in which participation rights are in fact awarded. In this image, there is a moment in 
each legal subject’s life at which citizenship is conferred resulting in awarding the 
new citizen a full bundle of rights and imposing the accompanying duties. 
This view also entails an assumption regarding the criminal law, an 
assumption that is not uncommon in criminal law theory. Namely, it assumes that 
the criminal law stands out from the rest of the legal/institutional structure. 
Whereas other areas of law, the assumption would go, empower people to enter 
certain relations therefore affirming their status as members of the political 
community, the criminal law’s aim is to exclude people. 
Let me start with the assumption regarding the nature of citizenship. The 
sense of citizenship that is relevant in this context is one that refers to what 
determines the normative position of a person within a legally constituted 
territory; her rights and duties in relation to others in the political community as 
well as the state, which institutionally represents the collective. One way of gaining 
normative access to the community is of course by being conferred the status of 
citizenship either by birth or acquisition. However, to consider this static 
conception of citizenship as the only way of becoming a member of the political 
community seems entirely at odds with how normative participation in modern 
states works especially in contemporary circumstances of increased inter-state 
mobility and intra-state pluralism. Rather than as a status, citizenship is best 
understood as a constant process of normative interacting – often a process that 
never reaches the state of being a citizen. It depends not necessarily on an originary 
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and ceremonial moment of status conferral but, all too frequently, on the web of 
normative interactions of the individual with the political community. It is 
therefore necessarily multi-layered and variegated. How narrow or wide the scope 
of membership of the political community (which I consider a more appropriate 
term than citizenship) is depends on the entailments of implicating an agent in the 
law in a certain way. 
Therefore, when trying to determine how one may permissibly be treated by 
the criminal law, the question becomes from ‘is one a citizen so as to be the 
proper subject of the criminal law?’ to ‘what does implicating the agent in the 
criminal law presuppose and what are its necessary upshots?’. 
I would suggest that being implicated in the criminal law has two general 
entailments, which are independent from the substantive aims that a criminal law 
system might pursue.  
The first entailment is that the subject of the criminal law is normatively 
capable of committing a criminal offence. This is broken down further. On a very 
basic level it means that that one has the bare capacity to act and to form certain 
intentional states. But more is required for an act or a failure to act to count 
specifically as a criminal offence. This entails that the agent is under certain duties 
to others, duties which are specifically legal, and that one commits a criminal 
offence as the subject of the criminal law. Suppose that some of these duties, such 
as the duty not to assault or cause the death of others, might be reflections in the 
law of duties, which everyone owes to others independently of the law. Be that as 
it may, no sooner are they institutionalised in law that they become specifically 
legal. Other duties will be more pervasively institutional. Some offences can only 
be committed by those who have been ascribed a certain institutional role. Such 
examples can be drawn from across the criminal law but, to stay in the context of 
immigration offences, take Art. 27 (1) and (4) of the Greek ISIC, according to 
which it is a disciplinary and criminal offence for civil servants to provide services to 
third country nationals who lack the appropriate documentation. 
The same can be the case in whole schemes of legal regulation. Consider the 
example of property offences generally. One can only commit a property offence 
if property relations are institutionalised in a way that makes certain interferences 
with others’ property a violation of a duty. Interferences with property offences 
are typically assumptions of property rights. Now, imagine someone who, by law, 
has been excluded from the law of property altogether; she may not own, possess 
and so forth. It will be impossible for that person to commit a property offence 
because it is institutionally impossible for her to assume property rights. She might 
be performing the physical act on which the assumption of the property right 
supervenes but she will not be committing the offence of assuming the property 
rights. 
The second general and necessary entailment is that punishment is authorised 
by the criminal law as a response to a violation of specifically legal duties by 
subjects of the criminal law, which, as I argued above, necessarily amounts to 
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being a citizen in the sense that one’s normative position is determined by a web 
of laws that is wider than the criminal law. Seen from the opposite perspective, the 
violation of a criminal law-related and –enforced duty triggers an obligation on the 
part of the offender to act or forebear in the way, in which the state’s response 
requires him to. It follows that punishment is meted out in the offender’s capacity 
as a subject of the law and that it must be such that can be served by subjects of 
the law. 
Let us now move from this admittedly high level of abstraction to some 
concrete examples drawn from the earlier discussion, which illustrate the 
incoherence of crimmigration legislation.  
As we saw, Greek (and European) law authorises the administrative 
expulsion of third country nationals who have committed offences either abroad 
or in Greece as well as the waiving of criminal prosecution and expulsion of third 
country nationals who have committed offences in the country. Expulsion from 
the country amounts to stripping the offender of her legal subjectivity altogether, 
because it makes it impossible for her to interact in a normatively/legally 
significant way with the political community of the country, in which the offence 
was committed. If my argument that it is a necessary entailment of treating people 
through the criminal law that punishment be meted out to offenders as subjects of 
the criminal law is correct, then it becomes immediately clear that expelling 
offenders for having committed a criminal offence is incoherent.19 Although the 
content of punishment can only be determined substantively and not by the 
formal requirements of the criminal law, it has to be such that it can be served by a 
proper subject of the criminal law. 
This is clearly the case when one is punished for crimes committed in the 
country. But how about those who are expelled because they have committed 
criminal offences abroad or only pose a risk of committing an offence in the host 
country? Does it make a difference that an offence has not been committed 
domestically? I would suggest that it does not. In responding by expelling the third 
country national either for offences committed abroad or for posing a threat of 
offending domestically, the municipal jurisdiction already implicitly accepts that 
the third country national is under some domestic criminal law related duties, the 
possible violation of which may incur punishment. As I argued earlier, to 
recognise one as bearer of such duties amounts to recognising one as a proper 
subject of the (criminal) law, who must therefore be treated accordingly. 
This already points to a fundamental problem with the all too common 
invocation of public order and national security, which ostensibly authorise the 
differential treatment of third country national as independent reasons. No sooner 
                                                      
19 Note that there might also be independent, concurring reasons drawn from one’s conception of the 
aims of punishment, for which expulsion-as-punishment is incoherent. Say, for example, that you are a 
retributivist who thinks that punishment somehow ‘undoes’ the wrong, which would otherwise stay in the 
community. It is hard to see how this ‘undoing’ of the wrong can happen outside the community. Or 
suppose you are a full-blown consequentialist about punishment. It is again difficult to see how the good 
consequences you might want to achieve will be achieved by all but relinquishing control over an 
offender’s actions by expelling her from the country leaving open the actual possibility of her return. 
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are security and order ascribed the character of legal reasons (which they are 
because of their inclusion in legislation as legal premises) for treating one in a 
certain way that a series of implications surfaces. The threat to security and order 
that one supposedly poses can only be a threat to disrupt the legal normative order 
that frames the political community by violating its norms. This already 
presupposes that the third country national is the proper subject of the law 
because only subjects of the law, and therefore members of the political 
community / citizens to one or another degree, have the normative capacity of 
violating the law in a way that undermines order and security. It follows that they 
must be treated as bearers of this normative capacity. This does not stop a 
government from in fact taking extra-legal measures against third country nationals 
or others in the name of security and order, i.e. measures which are not grounded 
in law at all. But it should be abundantly clear that such measures are complete 
departures from the legal order and that the state then operates not as a state any 
longer, not as the institutional structure that instantiates the political community, 
but rather as a private, and unhinged, agent acting on force alone rather than on 
authority. 
One possible response to this objection of incoherence might the substantive 
argument at which I hinted earlier. It might be that the reason for the exclusion is 
that there is no place in the political community for someone who has breached 
certain rules which are held to be of particular moral significance to such an extent 
that they constitute an admission threshold. One might draw a parallel to rules of 
associations: to be a member of the association, one must respect its rules; if one 
fails to do so, the association is at liberty to end the membership status of the 
violator of the rules.20 
The question then is what kind of person is accepted in a modern, broadly 
liberal, legally constituted political community. Associations might be constituted 
by specific values or goals, which its members are expected to endorse with the 
violation of the association’s rules raising a presumption of non-endorsement and 
therefore non-belonging. In contrast, the subject of the criminal law of a modern, 
liberal state is precisely the person who does not offer, and is not expected to 
offer, any guarantees that she will endorse or even not violate the rules that apply 
to her. The subject of the criminal law has the ability to develop desires and 
motivations, the reasoning ability to accept that she is under certain enforceable 
duties to others, and the ability to understand and accept that she will be justifiably 
be held accountable should she fail to discharge these duties.  
Of course, none of this is to say that the criminal law does not exclude 
offenders to some degree. Quite obviously, those with convictions are excluded 
from the exercise of some rights and the enjoyment of some resources, which 
would have otherwise been available to them. The correct way of making sense of 
this is as a, presumably justified, transformation of the normative position of the 
                                                      
20 I am grateful to Antony Duff for prompting me to think about this point in these terms. 
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person in the political community. This transformation, by incarceration, fine or 
whatever other punitive practice might be available in a political community, also 
generates some duties on the part of the state. Suppose, for example, that the 
point of a custodial sentence is deprivation of freedom. This means that the state 
is under an obligation to ensure that no other burden will be imposed on the 
offender either during the period of incarceration as well as post-sentence. Those 
who have been deprived of their liberty as a response to their criminal wrongdoing 
must be given the chance fully to reintegrate in the political community post-
punishment. 
Speaking of stateless people Hannah Arendt observes in passing in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism: 
 
The best criterion by which to decide whether someone has been forced 
outside the pale of the law is to ask if he would benefit by committing a 
crime. If a small burglary is likely to improve his legal position, at least 
temporarily, one may be sure he has been deprived of human rights. For then 
a criminal offense becomes the best opportunity to regain some kind of 
human equality, even it is be as a recognized exception to the norm.21 
 
The implications of Arendt’s dictum are now fully revealed. Becoming a proper 
subject of the criminal law amounts to more than being ostracised; it means 
remaining a member of the political community albeit with a different normative 
standing in it. 
So, total exclusion through expulsion is incoherent but this still leaves us with 
a state treating third country nationals differentially short of expelling them. What 
if, for example, a state excluded third country national defendants from the 
procedural guarantees reserved for citizens such as the exclusion from appellate 
procedures?22 The problem here is one of internal consistency. One becomes 
implicated in the criminal law because and only because one has failed to discharge 
duties to which one is subject. This means that differentiation between citizens 
and third country nationals in the way they are treated by the criminal law for the 
same offences is grounded on something other than the offence committed. This, 
however, is unjustifiable. This is so, even if the citizenship status of the defendant 
is included as a circumstance of the offence. Things would be different only if that 
status were part of the wrongfulness of the offence. 
This brings us to offences, which can only be committed by a third country 
national, i.e. cases in which the nationality status of the defendant is included in 
the actus reus of the offence. The criminalisation of entry or attempted entry 
without the appropriate documents is such an example. I have already said that 
there is already an incoherence in bringing into being and punishing the subject at 
one and the same time. The deeper normative implication of this is that such 
                                                      
21 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harvest 1973) p.286. 
22 Once again, I put to aside constraints from human rights and the Rule of Law to focus on the 
constraints imposed by treating people as proper subjects of the criminal law. 
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offences include the third country national as a member of the political 
community by making her the proper subject of the criminal law and at the same 
time punish her for not being a member of the political community. Spena argues that 
such offences, which are mala prohibita, fail to provide defendants any content-
independent reasons for complying with the prohibitions.23 If, however, we think 
of citizenship qua layered membership of the political community in terms of the 
web of rules to which one is subject, then we will see that third country nationals 
do have content-independent reasons to follow criminal law that apply to them. 
The problem here is substantive –and it is the normative extensions of the 
crimmigration laws in question creating their subjects only to punish her (section 
3.2 above). Offences which include the defendant’s citizenship status in the actus 
reus are, first, impossible to comply with, because they simultaneously include the 
third country national in the political community as the proper subject of the 
criminal law and punish her precisely for not being a member of the political 
community.  
The discussion so far should have also addressed the second assumption in 
much of the critique of crimmigration practices but also in much of criminal law 
theory generally, namely that the criminal law is an outlier in the legal system 
because it is an instrument of exclusion as opposed to other legal domains, which 
provide different channels of normative inclusion in the political community. This 
penal exceptionalism collapses as soon as we realise both that the subject of the 
criminal law is determined as such by the way in which she is shaped as a legal 
subject by other fields of law and that the determination of one’s normative 
position as a subject of the criminal law necessarily re-shapes one’s normative 
position in other legal fields. 
 
5.2 THE PERMISSIBILITY OF IMPLICATING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS IN THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 
 
So far I have discussed the implications of in fact involving a third country 
national in domestic criminal law. I have rejected the view that the coercive 
exclusion of aliens through the criminal law is an inevitable trait of modern liberal 
democracies arguing instead that it reveals a deep inconsistency with the very 
terms of operation of such legal systems. 
The next question is why it is permissible for the host state to implicate a third 
country national in its criminal law. In the real world this is a moot point. Legal 
systems typically and extensively do govern the lives of aliens by the criminal law 
and the first priority for theory should be to work out the implications of this, as I 
tried to do in the previous section. 
It is also the case that in a world that is increasingly legally interconnected, 
through various instruments such as human rights, international law and so forth, 
                                                      
23 Spena (n 18). 
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one is always to one or another extent subject to domestic legal systems. This 
already triggers the normative chain reaction, which I tried to describe earlier, thus 
authorising domestic jurisdictions to govern the lives of those who do not have 
full citizenship status. 
Nevertheless, suppose counterfactually that one is not the subject of domestic 
law at all. If the conception of membership of the political community is multi-
layered and incremental as I argued above and if it depends on one actually being 
implicated in the legal system rather than necessarily on some other originary 
moment or a fact, then one’s presence in a country’s territory alone does not 
suffice for one to become a subject of the law and gradually a member of the 
political community. It follows that implicating one in the criminal law seems like 
a unilateral coercive act.24  
In an admittedly very cursory way, I would suggest that the answer that best 
coheres with the rest of the argument in this article is an implicit consent-based 
one. Some might believe that this consent is assumed to have been offered by the 
third country national simply by her presence in the country. I do not think this to 
be the case. In-line with what I have been arguing so far, I do not consider mere 
physical presence and interference with the brute facts, on which the criminal law 
might supervene, sufficient for one to become a subject of the criminal law. Such 
subjection must be normative from the outset. Such a normative connection, and 
therefore an implicit consent to be subjected to the criminal law, is provided by a 
third country national’s acting in the host country in a way that manifests an 
intention to exercise rights, which would only be available to her had she been a 
subject of the legal system of the host country. Engaging in relations, which 
require normative membership status, relations pertaining, for example, to 
employment or property, signify a voluntary subjection to the normative web 
governing these relations. The criminal law is an inextricable part of this web. 
A second reason for which it is permissible for a state to subject a non-citizen 
to the criminal law is that interference with brute facts, which would have 
constituted a criminal offence have an impact on the normative standing of the 
victim in relation to other members of the political community. I will develop this 
argument further in the following section. 
 
5.3  THE NECESSITY OF TREATING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AS THE PROPER   
SUBJECTS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Whereas whether it is permissible for a state to involve non-citizens in the criminal 
law is of secondary significance in light of actual state practices, the question 
whether such involvement is necessary seems to be acquiring a new importance. 
As I pointed out in the earlier discussion, there are worrying signs that states tend 
                                                      
24 It should also be noted that the problem also haunts conceptions of the criminal law according to 
which the only threshold condition of criminalisation and punishment is moral wrongdoing, because even 
this requires a supplementary account of the jurisdiction of a state to criminalise and punish. 
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to exclude aliens from the criminal law as a way of excluding them from the 
political community altogether.  
Arguably the most interesting and promising attempt at reconciling a 
citizenship-based account of the criminal law with a duty to include third country 
nationals in the criminal law as its proper subjects has been offered by Antony 
Duff.25 Duff proposes that we consider non-citizens as guests, who, like all guests, 
are both protected and bound by the rules governing the host country. They are 
bound by these rules either because they incorporate universal duties, which apply 
to the guest anyway or out of respect for the modus vivendi of the host community. 
But they also ought to be protected as victims of crime: 
 
The more important point concerns responses to wrongdoing: a decent polity 
will count and treat wrongs committed within its borders against visitors as 
no less public, no less wrongful, than wrongs committed against citizens. Not 
only should we not wrong guests: if a guest in our home is wronged, that is 
our business; and whilst there are dangers that citizens will not take wrongs 
against visitors as seriously as they take wrongs against citizens (“She was 
only a tourist”), members of a civilized polity will not discriminate in this 
way.26 
 
The key thesis here is not that a state has the authority to punish because of the 
universality of some duties owed by everyone to everyone else but because of the 
guest status of non-citizens and the hospitality that the host state owes to non-
citizens. The question then is what generates these duties of hospitality. 
One possibility is that they are agent-dependent duties, in that states 
voluntarily take them on and are motivated by them. Suppose that this is the case 
leaving to one side the question of how collective intentions, goals, and 
commitments might be formed. As Zedner points out in objection to Duff, the 
substantive problem is that the whole argument would rely exclusively on the 
good will, so to speak, of states and we would be rather hard-pressed to find such 
good will especially, I would add, at a historical juncture where more and more 
states in fact display increased hostility against aliens. 
Alternatively, duties of hospitality are agent-independent and derived from 
some kind of universal normative order. Absent a global institutionalised rightful 
condition, duties of protection towards aliens, and the respective duties on aliens’ 
part, might be grounded in something which we might term solidarity or 
something similar. I have no doubt that a plausible argument along these lines can 
be made. Nevertheless, the scope and inevitably contested nature of such 
arguments makes it doubtful that they can be serviceable in real contexts, in which 
                                                      
25 R.A. Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law, in R.A. Duff and S.P. Green (eds), The 
Philosophical Foundations of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011). 
26 Ibid. 142. 
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real people are in fact stranded at the border and treated as administrative subjects 
to be processed rather than treated as the proper subjects of the law. In any case, 
the further question is raised of why these general duties of solidarity must then be 
specified as duties of hospitality and in what relation these latter ones stand to the 
first-order, former ones. 
Be that as it may, there are also some substantive issues with grounding the 
treatment of non-citizens in hospitality. The first problem is that hospitality still 
entails the asymmetrical relationship that I referred to in passing earlier in relation 
to charity. The host still remains an outsider and this already conditions the terms 
of the relationship. Hospitality might be denied; not everyone is always welcome 
in one’s home. It follows that administrative expulsion on grounds of security and 
order is perfectly justified. Secondly, there are some obvious limits to the duties 
that can be imposed on guests. One would be unreasonable to blame a guest for 
minor infractions of the host’s internal rules when it would not be unreasonable to 
have such expectations of those in the host country. Suppose that there is 
sufficient justification for this and that it is only a seeming departure from the Rule 
of Law. On a first reading, this beneficial differentiation in favour of guests might 
work in favour of non-citizens, as they would evade criminal responsibility for 
minor offences. On a closer look, however, we will see that it harbours the risk of 
actually obstructing the inclusion of non-citizens in the political community by 
severing the web of legal rules, subjection to which, as I argued earlier, provides 
the entry point into that political community. Therefore, whereas the aim of 
invoking hospitality as the ground of treating non-citizens as bearers of duties and 
rights was to include them in the political community, it might end up having 
exactly the opposite effect. 
As I have already said, I consider a much more stable ground for premising 
the inclusion of third country nationals in the political community of a host 
country through their subjection to the criminal law and the legal system at large, 
duties which the political community, as represented by the state, might owe to its 
members. Let me then attempt, however briefly and tentatively, to ground how 
duties owed to citizens might ground a duty to include non-citizens in the criminal 
law as its proper subjects. 
Suppose again that a third country national is radically excluded from the 
legal system at all, that one has no legal subjectivity in the host country. Suppose 
also that this third country national goes on to perform an act, which would have 
constituted the actus reus of a criminal offence had the third country national being 
granted the normative capacity to commit criminal offences. On the one hand, the 
act would not be a criminal offence because of the lack of normative capacity. It 
would be considered an accident and the victim might have some claim either 
against the state or private agents for compensation. But, at the same time, the act 
will have altered the normative position of the victim in relation to others, who are 
not liable to compensate her or otherwise redress this change in normative 
position. Property offences might provide the best possible example again here. 
Deprivation of the victim of her property rights will have an adverse impact on 
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her normative relations with a much wider network of agents within the political 
community. If, however, the ‘criminal’ act is treated as an accident this impact will 
not be registered by the legal system whereas it would be, had the victim been 
recognised as the victim of crime. 
The same is true, only from its reverse perspective, in the case of third 
country nationals who become victims of crime. To not recognise third country 
nationals as victims of crime amounts to not recognising the change in normative 
position of the perpetrator that the act brings about in relation to other, full 
subjects of the legal system, in the political community. 
There is a further, auxiliary argument, which I will outline without discussing 
it in much detail. This is an argument from potentiality. Suppose again that a third 
country national is not afforded a right to participation in the political community 
at all and all her actions are acts of nature and therefore those actions of hers, 
which would otherwise form the actus reus of a criminal offence, can only be seen 
as accidents. This is quite obviously a distortion of the truth. Even if third country 
nationals are not given the status of legal subject, they have the basic capacity to 
be such subjects. Therefore, actual interactions by citizens with non-citizens 
always have the potential of being interactions between subjects of the law. To 
strip non-citizens of all legal subjectivity also amounts to deprive citizens of the 
ability to form new normative relations within the political community while the 
possibility of forging social relations remains intact. Recall Articles 29 and 30 of 
the Greek ISIC, which make third country nationals’ status part of the actus reus of 
offences committed by citizens, as well as the fact that being in the country is a 
normative impossibility rendering all normative interactions between citizens and 
third country nationals impossible too thus distorting the social relations that in 
fact develop between the two parties. This amounts to depriving full members of 
the political community of the freedom to develop full-blown relations with others 
who have the potential of entering such relations. And from this, I would argue, 
stems a duty of the political community as represented by the state to realise this 
normative potential of third country nationals by granting them at least some 
access to the community’s legal structure. 
 
 
 
6     CONCLUSION 
 
This article attempted two things. The first was to add some information to the 
study of criminalisation at the border in Europe by outlining some ways in which 
Greek law, much of which is in implementation of EU law, organises the 
normative exclusion of one class of immigrants therefore facilitating and 
legitimising their actual exclusion. Secondly, it tackled the theoretical question of 
whether such practices are justifiable. The crux of the argument is that no sooner 
is a non-citizen involved in the criminal law that a web of duties and rights is 
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activated marking the gradual inclusion of the non-citizen in the political 
community as its proper subject. It follows that the differential treatment of non-
citizens is ungrounded on the very terms of the legal system of the host country. It 
was also argued that it is both permissible and necessary for a state to treat non-
citizens as the proper subject of the criminal law. The former, because of the 
implicit consent provided by non-citizens who engage in relations manifesting 
their intention to become a normative member of the political community; the 
latter out of respect for its own citizens, whose normative position is impacted on 
by their criminal law related interactions with non-citizens. 
 
 
